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SUMMARY
In a seminal and provocative book, Putnam argues that levels of trust, interest in public affairs and political
participation are the most important explanatory features of the differential institutional performance across
Italian regions over time. Despite the long-standing debate this work has generated on the concept of social
capital, there is a surprising lack of attempts to test his thesis empirically in other contexts. This paper examines
the possibility of replicating Putnam's argument in the context of Indian states, by discussing available data at
Indian state level, constructing new indicators, and attempting some preliminary statistical analysis of the
relationship between social capital and state performance. At each step of the process, a number of factors are
identified that restrict the validity of the exercise. Far from discounting Putnam's research question and
methodology, this paper points out the specific empirical and conceptual issues one needs to pay attention to,
when addressing the important topic of the roots of differential institutional performance in the Indian context.
Recommendations for future research in this area are to interpret data and design surveys very carefully; shift
the focus from states as units of analysis, to either clusters of states identified according to historical and
cultural features, or to selected areas for fieldwork comparison; and, finally, pay attention to the theoretical
framework, in particular to the dynamics of the institutions – social capital relationship and to the role of
education as a fundamental intervening variable in a country with widespread illiteracy such as India.
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31  INTRODUCTION
Does 'social capital' help in explaining the differential success of states and communities in improving their
material well being, reducing deprivation and enjoying a better quality of life?  Recent literature has emphasised
the importance of mutual trust, norms of co-operation and previous experiences of collective endeavours within
societies to explain higher incomes (Narayan and Pritchett 1995), economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1996)
and institutional performance (Putnam 1993). Much effort is now being put into collecting data on social capital
from various communities, to test how far it is linked to various aspects of well being.1
The notion that features of social organisation, levels of trust within groups and previous history of co-
operation affect social and economic outcomes is not new, as a long-standing tradition within sociology and
political economy can attest.2  However, the new elements in the recent interest in 'social capital' within the
social sciences are the notions that, first, one can measure the level of trust and cooperation, and compare these
levels across communities, regions or countries and, second, that one can assess empirically the influence of these
measured variables on various micro and macro social phenomena. While absorbed in theoretical elaboration of
the concept along new and old directions, social scientists have been keen to attempt measures of social capital
under different forms (level of trust, extent of inter-personal commitments, density of social networks, number
of tertiary associations, social homogeneity, political participation), and at various levels (the community, the
village, the region, the state).3
Part of this recent enthusiasm for the empirical application of the social capital notion derives from certain
dissatisfaction with existing explanatory frameworks of development. The question of why some countries are
more successful than others in managing to develop their economies and establish democratic government is
still a pressing puzzle, which decades of exercises in cross-country econometric analysis has not been able to
solve. It is apparent that the issue is not the amount of sheer resources pumped into a country, but the existence
of certain conditions for resources to be channelled effectively into priority goals. Government commitment to
development and the transparency and efficiency of the bureaucracy are crucial factors in this respect. However
these two conditions do not emerge in a social vacuum. The role of civil society, of citizens' awareness of their
own rights and responsibilities, and of features of social organisation must also be taken into account. The
recent attention of empirical analysis to some of these features is documented by a significant number of studies
which make use of non-conventional explanatory factors, such as indicators of corruption, accountability, and
potential for social conflict. The evidence is that some of these indicators may be important in accounting for
the observed differentials in social and economic development across countries and regions, although the lines
of causation and the transmission process often remain an open issue.
Among the most influential theoretical and empirical contributions on social capital is Putnam's (1993)
analysis of Italian regional governments' differential performance. The main argument of the book is that
features of social organisation that enhance trust and cooperation increase societies' well-being by making
government institutions more democratic and more efficient in delivering public goods. This work has enjoyed
an extraordinary success and spurred a continuing debate. Is it possible to use Putnam's methodology in other
countries, and explain differentials in institutional performance among governments with identical
organisational forms?  This issue has been examined in the context of Indian states. The objective has been not
so much to replicate Putnam's methodology (given that the main instruments of the enquiry were a short field
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Indian state level and identifying its role in explaining the differential performance of states.
The present paper presents some reflections on this research. Its structure is as follows. The next section
introduces the concept of social capital and briefly describes Putnam's methodology. Sections 3-5 identify,
respectively, three types of problems in the application of this methodology to inter-state analysis in India. First,
there is the difficulty of finding appropriate measures for the aspects of social capital proposed in Putnam
(1993). This is due not just to the lack of data per se, but to the ambiguity of the interpretation of those data that
already exist (Section 3). Second, even when searching for alternative aspects that are deemed more appropriate
to take into account the diversity of the social and political context in India, problems arise since these are, if
anything, more elusive aspects to measure and the state as a unit of analysis turns out to be quite inappropriate
(Section 4). Third, even when there is an indication of a statistical association between measures of social capital
and performance, this association may be spurious or the line of causation doubtful. One problem is the
powerful influence of literacy as an intervening variable, in a country where education is so unevenly spread
geographically and socially. In modern societies, literacy is fundamental for ensuring generalised trust and
cooperation, as it enables people to overcome the limits of informal and personal links, and to participate in
society at large; in turn, it provides citizens with the confidence and ability to deal with government officials and
put a pressure on government action. This is a point that emerges as decisive in the context of India, whereas it
was (predictably) not so important in the case of Italy. Section 6 presents some conclusions.
2  SOCIAL CAPITAL, INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
2.1 The General Framework
The importance of the existence of generalised trust and co-operation within communities for achieving
collective goals cannot be overemphasised. One of the most cited recent examples is the case of Russia, afflicted
by a pervasive wave of distrust and individualism, which is held responsible for the inability of this society to
recover from its chronic economic and social problems (Rose 1995), and for the deterioration of mortality
indicators, especially among children (Kennedy et al 1998). Although the connection between trust and
wellbeing is universally assumed, the mechanisms by which these two factors feed into one another are complex
and not easily predicted. Moreover, it is still unclear how trust and cooperative attitudes are generated and
maintained within societies.
Broadly, the link between trust and collective welfare can be analysed in two different frameworks. In the
first, social capital among a set of people affects their welfare directly, that is, co-operation and mutual trust
enable people to achieve together an outcome they would not be able to attain individually. Examples are
industrial districts, where small firms can compete with larger enterprises in export markets, thanks to the lower
costs and higher technology secured through mutual co-operation (Nadvi and Schmitz 1996); neighbourhood
associations, which in many US towns, seem to keep the level of juvenile crime under control, by parents
agreeing to share responsibilities for each other's children; and extended family networks, which assist their
members to emigrate or to start a new business, by providing the necessary financial and emotional support.
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government institutions. This framework, as developed in Putnam (1993), posits that societies where citizens
trust one another and are more inclined to co-operate give rise to more accountable and efficient governments,
which in turn are able to deliver a higher and better quality of public goods and create the conditions for society
to develop faster. This link is not simply unidirectional, since a vibrant civic society and a democratic and
efficient government are two sides of the same coin. However, the link from society to the institutional context
is particularly emphasised in Putnam's analysis: pressure from below through the different instruments of
voting, protest, and other expressions of disagreement induces representatives to adhere more closely to their
mandate.
In the first conceptualisation, social capital could in principle be measured at the individual level as it
amounts to the number and extent of relationships in which one is involved, and from which one draws from,
when in need of support, trust and favours. For instance, Coleman (1990) draws a map of social relations in
which individuals are nodes and social capital is represented as lines uniting them. The more lines connect to an
individual, the higher is the individual's level of social capital. The intensity and the direction of the obligations
embedded in these relationships are also important,4 with the amounts of net benefits from existing co-
operation changing according to one's position within the social fabric. This type of social capital functions as a
public good, but mainly within the group; this is more appropriately called a 'club' or 'network' good (Sandler
and Tschirart 1980). Club goods may generate externalities for societies at large, which can be either positive or
negative, according to whether the network is, for instance, a business association or a criminal organisation.
In the second framework, social capital cannot be measured at the individual or group level, since it is an
eminently public good, which benefits every member within a given society, including those who are neither
trusting nor trustworthy. This is so because, if there is a critical mass of people who keep trust and co-operation
high, the institutions that are the expression of that society will be efficient and accountable. When focusing on
this particular form of social capital, one should measure not the individual or the group's endowment of social
capital, but that of the society as a whole (this could be a state or region, as long as it has formal institutions
with some governing power).
The above distinction is important to avoid confusion regarding the meaning of social capital and its
potential role. This problem is particularly present, as will be seen later, in the Indian context, where the
interpretation on the basis of the first definition is more likely to be taken for granted. Clearly, the difference
between the two mechanisms just described is not so neat. Co-operation at the micro-level between groups is
always mediated by institutions (however informal) whose (implicit) role is to allocate rights and responsibilities
among members. Moreover, the relationship between informal institutions, such as the family, the
neighbourhood, the cluster of firms, and formal institutions may be one of interdependence and interaction.
Nonetheless, the two forms do not have to co-exist. High levels of trust and cooperation among members
of micro and informal institutions can be observed in societies characterised by widespread distrust in formal
government institutions. Surely, it may be the case that informal institutions in these conditions monopolise the
provision of trust and other services that the state is not able to ensure, and require exclusive loyalty from their
members in order to pursue particularistic goals rather than the collective good.5  On the other hand, relatively
effective and trustworthy institutions can operate among individuals who have no social fabric and no inter-
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leading to increasing rates of disaffection, suicide and violent crime across society, and is for instance
increasingly found in the rapidly transforming societies of Central and Eastern Europe.6
More likely, therefore, the existence of one form of social capital in the absence of the other is
dysfunctional. Not only are there different forms of social capital, but it is their combination and dynamics
through time that determine whether social relationships have positive developmental effects (Woolcock 1998).
The relationship between these forms is possibly the main challenge today facing research in this area. In
Putnam (1993) relationships between micro and macro forms of social capital are not explicitly discussed, and
the main focus remains the interface between generalised trust and horizontal associations, on one side, and
responsive and democratic government institutions on the other.
Putnam's (1993) enquiry originated from the aim to explain differential government performance (and
economic growth) across the 20 regions of Italy. The institutional performance of each region is measured by a
composite index based on 12 elements, which include promptness in approving the budget by the regional
assembly, extent of legislative innovation, provision of day care centres and of family clinics, industrial policy
instruments, local health unit expenditures and bureaucratic responsiveness to citizens' queries. This composite
indicator is shown to be highly consistent with opinions given by the region's citizens and with the degree of
satisfaction expressed by a sample of community leaders.
After arguing that the observed differences in institutional performance cannot be explained by
modernisation theories (as socio-economic indicators show a poor correlation with institutional indicators), the
author proceeds to test the potential explanatory power of some indicators of the degree of civicness in the
community. According to the neo-Tocquevillian framework embraced by Putnam, a civic community is
characterised by active participation in public affairs; horizontal, e.g. egalitarian, relations of reciprocity and
cooperation (as opposed to vertical relations based on authority and clientelism), bonds of solidarity and trust,
and distinctive social structures and practices characterised by thriving local associations.
The degree of civicness in each region is measured by means of quantitative and qualitative indicators; in
particular, voter turnout at referenda, lack of candidate preference voting in political elections, newspaper
readership and density of sport and recreational associations. The statistical relationship between regional
variation in institutional performance and differences in the degree of civicness is found to be more significant
than in the case of socio-economic variables. This is taken to suggest that an effective government-citizen
relationship is the outcome of successful solutions to dilemmas of collective action. Norms of reciprocity and
networks of civic engagement favour this outcome, because they raise the costs of defection, facilitate
information among people, reduce uncertainty and provide models for future cooperation. Particular importance
is attributed to membership of cultural and recreational associations, as opposed to that of business groups,
unions and parties. Since the former types of associations do not entertain a specific economic and political
purpose, they are more likely to provide the context within which people internalise principles of trust and co-
operation.
72.2 Application to the Indian Context
India is divided into 24 states and 7 union territories. Indian states share many fundamental political features
and have similar government structures, and yet the contrast between their achievements in terms of social
stability, economic performance and social indicators could not be greater. Differences in terms of the operation
of the political system, the party in power and the type of policies pursued are undoubtedly crucial to explain
this divergence (Weiner 1968; Kohli 1987). However, there is also a perception that features such as state-wide
identification, previous experience of mass mobilisation and high political participation can have a profound
influence, not only on the type of policies to be chosen, but also on their effectiveness.
It has been argued, for instance, that states with greater administrative efficiency and socio-political
development are also those which in the post-independence period had an active political community claiming a
state formation on the basis of linguistic homogeneity (Weiner 1968, 1989). States like Tamil Nadu, West
Bengal and Punjab are thus set against Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. Shared historical roots
and a negotiated unification process were important to establish, among both administration and citizens in the
former group of states, a greater civic sense, to use Putnam's words. This does not imply, however, a lower level
of conflict within society or the absence of other kinds of divisions along caste, religious or political lines (a
point to which we will return later); Punjab, for instance, has been most severely afflicted by conflict and
violence.
The uneven distribution of the British legacy, in terms of the development of the administrative system,
and of communications and infrastructure, represents another complicating factor. States along the coast
(especially Gujarat, Maharashtra, and West Bengal) have been exposed for some time to various waves of
European influence, and were those where colonial policy had some developmental effects. On the other hand,
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan suffer from a backward administrative system, most of their territory being
divided, during colonisation, either into several small principates or into scattered units of British
administration. At independence, they became states not out of the united fight of the people, nor on the basis
of a common social or cultural identity, but because there was nothing else to do with the various constituent
parts.
With independence, the constitution gave state governments the power and the duty to play an important
part in the overarching objectives of the newly formed India: to eradicate poverty, grant universal education and
access to health care, and ensure participation of every citizen to collective and political life. States take
expenditure decisions in the sectors of health, education, infrastructure, agriculture and rural development,
among others. Not surprisingly, the observed disparities across states in terms of their economic and social
development, in the presence of similarly designed government institutions, have constituted a focus of primary
attention in recent decades.
Poor performances have been explained in terms of previous historical experiences (more exploitative
colonial domination), archaic productive relations in the countryside, lack of social change, ideology of the state
in power, type of family systems etc. All these elements, although sometimes studied separately, are inextricably
linked to one another. In particular, it seems that political failures at the top are as important causes as
corruption of the local bureaucracy, and malfeasance or inertia on the part of the population. There might be a
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some Indian states. The question is whether this is at all similar to the one Putnam has found for Southern Italy,
namely low mutual trust, absence of the conditions for individuals to pursue collective endeavours, lack of
historical experience of cooperation —  in summary, what Putnam calls a lack of 'social capital'.
This seems to be a legitimate research question. The problems lie with the tasks of constructing and
interpreting measures of social structures of co-operation, solidarity and trust, which may impinge on state-
citizen relations. These issues are dealt with in the next three sections.
3  PUTNAM'S INDICATORS: PROBLEMS OF DATA AVAILABILITY AND
INTERPRETATION
In this section we consider the problems of arriving at a measure of the degree of society's 'civicness' in India, as
in the neo-Tocquevillian definition endorsed by Putnam in his study of Italy. Is it possible and meaningful to
construct indicators for Indian states similar to those derived for Italian regions?  As mentioned above, a civic
community is characterised by active participation in public affairs, horizontal relations of reciprocity and
cooperation, bonds of solidarity and trust, and distinctive social structures and practices characterised by
thriving local associations. Regional indicators for Italy were turnout at national referenda, lack of candidate
preference voting in parliamentary elections, membership in associations and newspaper readership. We
consider thus the possibility of constructing similar indicators for Indian states, leaving aside preference voting,
which is peculiar to the proportional electoral system then present in Italy, and does not therefore apply to the
Indian context.
Political Participation. The extensive participation of the masses in political life has been a notable feature in
India since independence, and contrasts with the more limited participation in many new states in Africa and
Asia (Weiner 1989). The electoral process is among the most important and widespread forms of participation.
It has remained fundamental despite recurrent intense political violence and the suspension of democracy in
1975-77.
However, casting a vote to elect politicians is not necessarily dictated by civic-minded motives. If Putnam
was wary of turnout data for political elections in the case of Italy, why should they be more valid indicators of
social capital in India, where the politics of patronage and the exchange of vote are no less?  In the complex and
internally divided Indian society, political parties tend to align themselves, at least at local level, on caste and
ethnic lines, with the consequence that voting patterns often reflect not the individual's conscious choice but the
dictates of one's group's leaders (Nuna 1989). As the author of a recent publication on electoral politics states, 'it
is quite ironical that, even after 50 years of Indian independence, 90 per cent of women in India go to vote for
reasons other than political - either because it provides a good outing or because they are persuaded by their
fathers, husbands and sons, who in turn are persuaded in the name of caste, class, religion or monetary favours
in the majority of cases' (Ahuja 1998: p.273).
In the Italian context, Putnam selected turnout at national referenda as a more pertinent indicator of a
behaviour driven by social and moral concerns, rather than by the game of politics (as topics of referenda
9ranged from divorce to abortion). Unfortunately, there are no analogous consultations in India, or features for
which similar indicators are available. Participation in the elections of the recently revived Panchayati Raj
bodies, which have been hailed as an opportunity at last for people to take a role in the government of local
issues, is too recent to generate significant indicators for all states. Those elections to Panchayats held before the
recent constitutional amendment were very often plagued by a politics of patronage and exchange of votes to be
useful.7
In the absence of alternative measures of political participation, figures on voter turnout at assemblies
elections will be taken as the best available indicators (on the grounds that it is better to consider them with due
caution than to reject them altogether). Figure 1 shows the time trends in election turnout at the Lok Sabha and
Vidhan Sabha (respectively national and state assembly) for 15 major states from the first elections in 1952 until
1991.8  Trends over time do not exhibit any particular pattern (except for an ascending one for Bihar, Orissa
and possibly West Bengal); their erratic behaviour is not only due to the typical mood swings of the electorate
but also to exceptional episodes, such as economic or political crises (like for instance in the 1981 elections in
Assam). A generalised rise in turnout is discernible, if anything, from the first to the third or fourth round of
election (all-states average turnout goes from 51% in 1952 to 62% in 1967), which is likely due to the increase
in literacy and in  political awareness in the new nation.
Spatial comparisons averaged over time are highlighted in Table 1, which reports for 16 major states
(including Himachal) the mean turnout at the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections over the period 1952-
1991, along with the corresponding state ranking. Average turnout ranges from over 75 per cent in Kerala to
45.7 per cent in Orissa (the latter is affected by the very low participation during the first few elections). Besides
Kerala, the other states with above average turnout are West Bengal, the southern states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra
Pradesh and Karnataka and the three northern states of Haryana, Himachal and Punjab.
What leads to greater participation in these states?  Certainly, explanations focused on the contrasting
patterns of kinship between the South and the Centre-North (whereby prevalent matrilineal and endogamous
family structures in the South lead to lower conflicts within the extended family, higher female status and a
more 'progressive' and open culture) come to mind;9 as well as those arguing that favourable agro-climatic
conditions have induced more flexible and dynamic social structures, for example, in Punjab and Haryana
(Banerjee 1997). The role of historical factors has been mentioned earlier. Areas which were formerly part of
British India and/or states with established movements for independence have experienced higher political
participation than those ruled by Maharajas or constituting part of the larger Hindi linguistic area (Weiner 1968).
But one factor may be very crucial, namely, literacy.
Average literacy across the four decennial censuses 1961-91 has been calculated for the 16 major states
(see Table 1). The states with higher than average literacy (the mean for all states is 40 per cent) are, in
descending order, Kerala, Himachal, Haryana, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, and West Bengal (note that
Himachal and Haryana are near the top because literacy data are available only from the two last censuses, thus
leading to a higher average than would otherwise be the case). The two state rankings with respect to turnout
and literacy exhibit only a few differences: the two western states of Gujarat and Maharashtra have a turnout
much lower than predicted by their mean literacy levels, whereas the southern state of Andhra Pradesh has a
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low literacy but high participation at elections; moreover, Punjab and Karnataka are slightly below the average
literacy but above the average turnout.
The correlation coefficient between the average turnout at the election and average literacy is positive and
high (R2 = 0.73, significant at 0.001 per cent level). This high value implies that either greater literacy in a state
induces higher turnout, by empowering people not only with the mere technical ability to vote but also with a
heightened political consciousness and sense of collective identity; or a greater political consciousness of the
people leads to better public services, e.g. more functioning schools, hence higher literacy levels. The latter, if
true, would confirm the social capital hypothesis (for the empirical problems in disentangling this relationship
see Section 5) but it cannot be denied that the causal process from literacy to turnout is also at work. States with
above average literacy in 1991 are in general the same as those with greater literacy at the time of independence.
The legacy from the pre-colonial and post-colonial past, in terms of both the type of government in power and
the policies pursued, appears as important as the actions undertaken by state governments since independence.
Membership in Associations. The only data on membership in associations at state level are those available
from the Ministry of Rural Development in relation to a number of associations constituted under government
initiatives. In its emphasis on participatory rural development, the Indian government has tried to establish,
since 1952 with the launch of the Community Development Programme, various rural associations, for the
promotion of members' well being and also as a link to government programmes. Data on the number and
membership of women's associations (Mahila Mandals) have been used elsewhere as state-level indicators of
social capital (see Morris 1998). However, these data cannot be considered as satisfactory measures, since many
of these associations exist merely on paper, or their members' list is arbitrarily inflated in order to qualify for
government funding. Being set up by means of a top-down initiative, these associations cannot represent a
relevant example of a society's way of dealing with collective problems.
Voluntary associations is another matter, and their vibrancy in India is quite extraordinary in many
respects, both for their geographical coverage and their capacity to involve poor and otherwise powerless
groups. These various forms of collective expression have shown their strength not only in achieving important
material goals (as they set objectives such as minimum wages, new literacy and health programs, and inclusion
of disadvantaged groups) but also in giving opportunities to people to connect with one another and find a
common identity. Voluntary agencies can play a useful role in training people in methods of co-operation and
organised work, but also in enhancing democratic participation in society at large by empowering individuals
and raising their social understanding.
However, data on the numbers, membership and activity of voluntary associations are neither available nor
comparable at state level. The large amount of work devoted to the analysis of the extraordinary role of these
associations as an instrument of democratic development has not yet led to attempts to derive a comprehensive
picture of the activity of these associations over the whole Indian territory.10
Newspaper readership. Turning to aspects other than participation, the data situation is not necessarily better.
There is no comprehensive survey on newspaper readership in India nor on access to media in general, which
would indicate to what extent people are able to get information on issues relevant at the local or state level.
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Only data on newspaper circulation or of number of TV sets per capita are available, which are clearly
insufficient given the often public nature of the media, even more so in India, where papers can pass through
many hands and people often gather together at public places to watch TV.
Overall, the above remarks show the inappropriateness of existing aggregate data (with the possible
exception of voter turnout) for measuring three of the four aspects taken into account by Putnam, because of
the failure of such measures to reflect closely people's disposition to cooperate in order to attain collective goals.
As mentioned earlier, surveys may represent more valid means for getting information on people's views of
politics, their level of trust in governments, types of associational activity, and interest in public affairs.
However, the virtual absence of surveys covering these topics makes it difficult to confirm this impression.
A survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), the 1996 National
Election Study Post-Poll Survey, is practically the only one, to our knowledge, which allows us to compare
aspects of social capital across states.11  Although the survey is conceived as a post-poll survey, aimed at
analysing voting patterns and changing political allegiance of the electorate, it also asks questions on social
structures of participation and cooperation. In particular, thirteen questions are relevant to the social capital
concept.12  They identify broadly two areas, the first on electors' views about their community, the role of
elections and their representatives and officials; the second covering electors' participation in community and
public affairs: membership in associations, extent of contact with public officials and media usage. State
aggregate data have been considered, since state-wise comparison is the focus here.
Responses are typically qualitative categories of the type Yes/No or A great deal/somewhat/never. For
each question, we have selected the type of response that is most consistent with the notion of trust, adherence
to democratic politics and active participation in public affairs. For instance, to the question on whether one has
trust in state governments, the percentage of people who answered 'a great deal' has been considered. Table 2
lists the thirteen questions together with the answers that most interest us, and Table 3 shows the corresponding
percentages of respondents in each of the main 16 states.
All-India values for the social capital variables so generated are quite low (none is over 50 per cent). The
highest scores are obtained on the issue of caste-related vote (48 per cent of the entire sample believe one's vote
should not be influenced by caste membership), on the trust in state and local governments (around 40 per
cent), and on the utilisation of any media at the time of an election. But, overall, people in India appear to have
little interest in politics, little confidence that elections may make governments aware of ordinary people (just
over 13 per cent of the sample believe they do), and to be little exposed to media in general.
Particularly puzzling are the low percentages of respondents who declare membership of any
organisation/association. Membership of caste or religious associations is below 6 per cent in most states and
only greater than 10 per cent in Kerala, whereas membership in other organisations (recreational, cultural, co-
operatives) is over 10 per cent in just Kerala, Assam and West Bengal. These figures seem lower than what one
would expect on the basis of the impression typically formed of India of a lively associational life. One possible
explanation is that these figures only capture membership of formal associations and organisations, and exclude,
for instance, informal yet locally recognised collective structures that are very important, especially in villages. In
other words, features of associational life may prove to be more elusive than one might think. This would
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require either a more sophisticated and penetrating set of questions, or complementary instruments of
investigation, like direct observation of specific village reality.
One feature which the questionnaire has been able to indicate quite well, is the exceptionality of Kerala.
This state exhibits the highest scores on almost all variables, and exhibits a quite unique profile with respect to
all other states.13  Such findings attest to the marked political consciousness of Kerala people, which has led, as
is widely recognised, to a highly effective state-citizen interaction and to a very democratic society. Kerala
appears as the best Indian example of a society with high social capital. Uncovering why this is so is key to a
better understanding of social capital (see Section 5).
In order to get a comprehensible picture of the relationship existing between the features measured by the
survey, pair-wise correlation coefficients were calculated (see Table 4). Of the three variables that we have
named 'election variables', two seem to be highly related to one another (those named 'elected' and 'elections').
The perception that elected representatives care about what electors think is highly correlated across states with
the belief that elections induce governments to pay more attention to the people (coefficient 0.77). Moreover, it
is significant that in those states where this view of elections prevails, people place greater trust in state
government (coefficients are 0.67 and 0.55 respectively), are more interested in politics (0.57 and 0.55) and are
also more likely to have contacted officials about some problems (coefficients are 0.71 and 0.61). Moreover,
exposure to papers, radio or other media is significantly positively correlated with interest in politics and with
contact of officials.
On the other hand, one notes the lack of correlation between the election variables mentioned above and
the belief in a vote unfettered by the influence of caste or religious leaders. Also, the three 'trust variables' are
predictably highly correlated with one another, but there seems to be no relation with interest in politics, media
usage and the belief that votes should not follow suggestion from one's own caste or community group. The
correlation coefficient with the feature 'contacts with officials' is also low (coefficients are, respectively, 0.33,
0.26 and 0.14).14  Positive and significant relationships are evident with the two 'association variables'. This
would support the notion that trust in members of societies and trust in government/representatives do feed
into one another, especially because the coefficient attached to 'other associations' is greater than to those
identified by caste and religious affiliation. However, as mentioned above, the membership variables must be
taken with caution in this survey.
The absence of relationship between trust in governments/officials and most other features is a
problematic element from the viewpoint of social capital theory, according to which trust in institutions is
fundamental in maintaining an effective relationship between government and citizens. Moreover, trust cannot
be discarded here as a low key variable, as is the case for association membership. The majority of people in
India do have some trust in their state and local government (only 19.2 per cent and 23.2 per cent do not trust
their state and local governments, respectively). What then does trust reflect in this case?  Is it possible that,
when governments and officials are themselves not too deserving, the presence of trust on the part of citizens
should be taken as a negative rather than a positive element?  That is, admission of one's trust may not always
reflect a conscious knowledge of government actions and trustworthiness, but sometimes a mechanic and
passive compliance, and maybe, even the existence of collusion with corrupt behaviour. The problem is how to
distinguish these two meanings across different contexts. Here, the lack of significant relationship between trust
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in governments/officials, on the one hand, and most other variables, in particular interest in politics, contact of
officials and newspaper readership, on the other, may represent a warning as to the interpretation to be given to
trust.
If this is the case, it means that some of the aspects measured by the CSDS survey are not unambiguous
indicators of civic behaviour, as one might have thought. This is a similar problem to that identified earlier with
other data, for instance those on turnout at elections. One way of separating out the independent factors among
a set of variables is to apply factor analysis, more precisely principal component analysis. The latter aims to find
a small number of orthogonal components that can linearly reconstruct a larger set of variables, and is often
resorted to when the latter are highly collinear, as this makes them unsuitable to regression analysis. Principal
components are identified for eleven of the original variables, after excluding the two association variables due
to their low significance and to the lack of observations for Andhra Pradesh.
The top of Table 5 shows that only the first two components are highly relevant, as they have eigenvalues
greater than one, and together explain over 80 per cent of the total variance. They are therefore retained for the
estimation of the score coefficients. On the first factor, all loadings are positive (see bottom of Table 5). This
factor can be easily interpreted as a general 'social capital' variable, in the sense that states that score high on
these eleven questions can be expected to have citizens who participate to a greater extent in community issues
at large and accept the rules of the existing democratic system.
The second factor loads negatively on 'vote', 'interest', 'contact' and the three media variables, and
positively on all others. It identifies a sub-set of states where citizens are ready to answer positively to questions
about attitudes and trust (in the electoral mechanism, in government representatives and in officials), but they
are themselves not interested in politics, rarely contact officials, have a very limited exposure to media, and,
especially believe that it is important to vote according to the opinions of caste or religious leaders (this has the
highest negative loading). This second factor could be interpreted as conservative compliance to existing order,
implying no direct personal commitment. It may indicate a passive attitude on the part of citizens, possibly due
to unresponsive and disinterested governments, so that there is a lack of a predisposition to co-operate and
engage for better change.
The ranking of states with respect to these two components is quite revealing (Table 6). In relation to the
first factor, Kerala appears to be well ahead of other states, followed by Assam and West Bengal. Gujarat and
Punjab are at the bottom. However, the scores on the second component modify radically the state ranking with
Kerala just ahead of Punjab and Gujarat, but at the opposite end to Assam. The reason why Kerala and Assam
are so different in terms of the second factor can be gauged by looking again at Table 3. While Kerala scores
high on all questions, Assam's citizen-government relationship appears problematic: around 65 per cent of the
population declare their trust in government but only 7 per cent are interested in politics and less than 10 per
cent regularly read newspapers.
Punjab, on the other hand, scores very low on most questions, of the first and second 'type'; government
institutions have little credit in the eyes of citizens, who might react to such disaffection by retreating to private
and closed forms of collective life. This does not necessarily imply that Punjab has a low value of social capital
in its more extensive connotation, but only with respect to the notion captured by the CSDS questionnaire,
which may well denote a restricted version. Given the highly conflictual political situation in particular during
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the mid-1990s in Punjab, respondents to the questionnaire are likely to have been conditioned, even more than
usual, by current events, and conveyed their anxieties and disaffection with politics.
In conclusion, the set of variables derived from the CSDS 1996 survey shows that there is a significant
relationship among some of the factors in the literature groups under the heading 'social capital', but there is
also a lack of significant correlation between some crucial variables. Rather than implying the failure of Indian
social features to meet theoretical predictions about the mutual reinforcement of engagement and trust, this may
be due to a combination of two reasons. First, that the measured variables are unable to capture what we mean
by generalised trust and collective structures of cooperation. Second, forms of participation apparently in line
with the notion of civic virtue may not be so. Situations whereby trust in government institutions is high but
forms of participation in collective life are scarce cannot be taken as exhibiting high levels of social capital in the
Putnam sense. These two possibilities suggest the need for further research with more refined methodologies,
and for the analysis of survey data to question the assumption that certain variables are unambiguous indicators
of civic virtue.
4  INTERPRETATION AND QUANTIFICATION OF OTHER ASPECTS OF
SOCIAL CAPITAL IN INDIA
The problems identified in the previous section, one might argue, result from attempting to find measures of
political engagement and mutual solidarity in India similar to those found in Italy. When applying a theory to a
very different context from the original one, it is important to be able to adapt and modify concepts, while
maintaining the basic idea. But to what extent can one stretch the original formulation to search for genuine and
meaningful forms of social capital in India?  And in what measure can one thus overcome the criticisms of
those who raise doubts as to whether the concept of social capital, in the Putnam sense, is at all appropriate for
Indian society?
Among Indian scholars and development practitioners the term 'social capital' is intended mostly to
describe social networks based on kinship ties or on caste and religion, which provide vital support to
individuals. Absence of social capital in this sense means inability to face life contingencies, poverty, exclusion
and powerlessness. Structures of cooperation are regarded as alternative, and sometimes antithetic, to formal
institutions, as they arise to provide those goods and services that the latter are too weak or too corrupt to
ensure. Governments and officials are regarded as distant and often hostile by ordinary Indian people. All this
implies a certain resistance to conceptualising social capital as an ingredient for effective and fruitful interaction
with governments. It is instead more often conceived as a source of support for an identifiable and connected
set of people. It is the first and not the second definition, out of those given in Section 2, which more naturally
comes to mind when thinking of social capital in India.
Nonetheless, various strands within the current literature do provide good examples that attest the validity,
in the Indian context, of a concept of social capital à la Putnam. Studies on educational structures and facilities
suggest that the source of the higher quality of services in Kerala as opposed to Uttar Pradesh lies with the
attitudes of parents, and their willingness and capability to voice their protest and take appropriate action if
needed, when teachers are absent, infrastructure is decaying, and promised funds do not arrive.15  Mobilisation
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is possible when people share their understanding of the common good and trust one another to achieve this
objective. That citizens' voices and reactions might be what makes the difference between malfunctioning and
efficient schools in India provides an appropriate example of the notion that greater social capital makes
existing physical and human capital more effective (Ostrom 1996).
The contribution of the social capital factor emerges also in another sphere, that of anti-poverty
programmes. Poor people's political mobilisation may be crucial to force governments (of whatever ideology) to
be accountable and adhere to electoral promises, and various important examples in this direction exist in the
distant and recent past in India. Not just political or organisational factors, but also social features (and the type
of social relations), determine whether anti-poverty programmes are successfully implemented.
But what are the elements that enable poor people to give voice to their dissent and defend their own
rights? Qualitative evidence has shown that previous experience of collective action, local presence of NGOs,
and literacy rates are important factors in accounting for local communities' capacity to interact with institutions
to achieve better outcomes. It has been suggested that the presence of social movements from the last century
is, for instance, able to explain in part the current distribution of modern forms of mobilisation, such as
workers' movements, peasant movements, anti-caste movements and women's movements, which have
managed at times to exert great pressure on governments.
However, these phenomena are hard to capture by means of quantitative indicators, due to a lack of
comprehensive figures on these movements and activities. It would also be difficult to gauge their presence in
terms of states as units of analysis. Despite the state-wide resonance of some of these movements, the fact that
some Indian states are as big and diverse as the world's largest nations makes state comparison quite
meaningless.
In looking for other sources of trust and cooperation, one might consider whether some of the theories
that have been discarded by Putnam as irrelevant for Italy might be more appropriate in the case of India.16  In
particular, the notions of social cohesion and political harmony need to be considered, not only for the potential
role these features can have in a highly diverse society like India, but also because they are increasingly held up
as very crucial in other contexts (Klitgaard and Fedderke 1995; Easterly and Levine 1995). Ethnic and linguistic
fragmentation has been found to be an important empirical factor associated with slow economic growth or
difficult democratic transition. Easterly and Levine (1995), for instance, found that a measure of ethnic diversity
is negatively correlated with economic growth, schooling attainment, availability of infrastructure and sound
policies in a number of African countries.
The basic tenet is that people similar to one another in terms of language, ethnicity and culture, manage to
cooperate more successfully due to ease of communication, possibility of building reputation and trust, and the
presence of common values and conventions. On the other hand, history has repeatedly shown that this notion
is much more difficult to substantiate in practice, as many other factors intervene in determining whether trust
can ensue, to the point that the factor of diversity can become marginal.17
Indian society is characterised by a great degree of fragmentation in ethnicity, caste, religion and class. The
importance of linguistic identity has already been noted. Basically India is divided between states which were
formed out of linguistic homogeneous areas, and those which belong to the larger Hindi speaking area. The
16
former group includes, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil
Nadu and West Bengal.
Leaving aside caste composition,18 religion is a very divisive and complex issue at the state level. In our
sixteen states Hinduism (or its Sikh version in Punjab) constitutes the main religion, which co-exists with
various others, the most important of which, by far in most states, is Islam. Kerala is the only state with an
equal and significant proportion of two minority religions, as Muslim and Christian communities each account
for approximately 20 per cent of the population.
Can any measure based on a state's linguistic or religious composition bear any statistical relationship with
indicators of state performance?  I found no evidence of such a relationship when using various combinations
of fragmentation measures and performance indicators. One important reason for the failure of either religious
or linguistic fragmentation to account for differences in state performance may be the multiplicity of the divisive
lines running through Indian societies. The co-existence of these many and non-over-lapping dimensions has
prevented a single element ever to prevail and factions of a permanent nature to crystallise (Manor 1996). Indian
societies witness constant fluidity and frequent changes in alliances, quite unlike the ethnically diverse but
otherwise relatively homogeneous societies of Africa. It is a fact that Nehru's fear of separatist tendencies, as
supposedly resulting from the constitution of states along linguistic lines, has not materialised, because of the
many other differences dividing citizens within each state (notably caste and religion). Paradoxically, the
complex stratification of Indian society has acted in favour of its unity.
In conclusion, therefore, whether the co-existence of several linguistic and ethnic groups is an obstacle to
developmental outcomes is not an issue that can be resolved on the basis of aggregate data on the relative
proportion of the population in different religious or linguistic groups. It requires instead more attentive and
thorough analysis.
5  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL CAPITAL AND STATE
PERFORMANCE: THE PROBLEM OF THE INTERVENING VARIABLES
In the previous two sections we discussed the problems associated with identifying aspects of social capital
which are both meaningful in the Indian context and measurable. Some indicators have been retained, namely
turnout at elections and the two composite variables derived from the CSDS survey (Table 6), yet doubts have
been raised as to their ability to reflect appropriately the elements of cooperation, generalised trust and
solidarity. This conjecture cannot be confirmed, however, until a test of their empirical significance is carried
out. This section presents a preliminary analysis of the role of the social capital indicators identified so far in
explaining state differences in performance and socio-economic outcomes.
A problem with inter-state analysis is the extreme complexity underlying regional economic, political and
social variation, because of the multiple ways in which all these factors combine together locally.19  Typically,
'good' performance in one aspect is often accompanied by poorer performance in another yet equally important
dimension, making the task of drawing lessons for development more difficult than ever.
This is particularly evident when comparing socio-economic indicators. Table 7A shows the achievements
of the 16 major states in terms of: growth in national income during the period 1980-93; 1992-93 headcount
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poverty index; 1991-92 per-capita state domestic product; 1992-93 infant mortality rates; 1989-91 life
expectancy at birth; 1991 female literacy rates, and 1991 human development index (HDI). The latter is
calculated on the basis of three indicators: per capita consumption (GDP), life expectancy and literacy rates.
Table 7B shows the ranking of states in terms of the indicators in Table 7A. The variation of states'
positions across rankings is quite remarkable. Only states at the bottom maintain similar rankings, in particular
Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, and also Uttar Pradesh to a lesser extent (it was 6th in the poverty ranking).
Rajasthan, the other BIMARU state,20 although ranking low on human development variables, has, on the
positive side, a good record in terms of growth.21  Orissa, another backward state in many respects, also exhibits
a good performance recently in terms of poverty. Overall, these data confirm that the five mentioned states are
'problem' states, where lack of growth and especially greater poverty is interlinked with low human
development.
For the other states, instead, the picture is less consistent. There are not best performing states as such, and
states that rank high on some indicators are clearly less good at others. In fact, Table 7 provides a snapshot of
different types of development achieved by Indian states, a topic extensively analysed in the literature. On the
one hand, there is the model of agricultural growth, increases in per capita income and investment in
infrastructure, represented by Punjab and Haryana. On the other hand, there is the Kerala model of
development, which is evident to a lesser extent also in Tamil Nadu, involving massive investment in human
development and an emphasis on redistribution (land reforms, minimum wage legislation).
Although Kerala and Punjab have the highest HDI in India, they differ significantly with respect to the
elements composing this indicator. Kerala's life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rates and education,
particularly of women, are at the level of the world's middle-income countries.22  However, growth and
employment are stagnating, and therefore per capita SDP is low.23  On the other hand, Punjab has achieved the
fastest growth and ensured the highest per capita income in India, but it occupies only 8th position in the state
ranking with respect to mean literacy in 1961-91 (see Table 1). Another interesting case is that of Haryana,
which has the second highest per capita state domestic product (SDP), but ranked 9th in terms of literacy during
the last census, and 10th in terms of female literacy.
The Kerala model is about how to achieve rapid and effective social development at low levels of per
capita income, whereas the Punjab-Haryana model is about the trickle-down effect of growth. However trickle-
down processes have not been successful everywhere, translating into lower human development indicators.
Low education and health inhibit people at large from enjoying the fruits of the expansion in economic activity.
For instance Gujarat, though one of the richest states, exhibits a comparatively low level of human
development, and persistent inequality and poverty (14th position in the ranking with respect to poverty
headcount in the early 1990s).
The complex multi-dimensionality of Indian development implies the difficulty, here more than ever, of
explaining differential success in terms of a single indicator. On the contrary, Putnam's analysis of Italian
regions shows there is a rough correspondence between regions with greater economic growth and those with
better performing democratic institutions and higher quality of public services. Putnam finds that his
constructed index of 'social capital' can explain both growth and democracy.
18
We thus confine the analysis to one specific dimension of state governments' institutional performance,
that of health. This particular choice reflects the great importance attributed to the provision of health services
for the well-being of the general population, the richness of studies on determinants of health indicators in India
(Dasgupta et al. 1995, 1997), and the fact that health improvements are only weakly related with pure economic
factors (per capita income) (Caldwell 1986). Our selected indicators relate both to the level of inputs ensured by
the government (the level of expenditures in the state budget, the availability of infrastructures and medical
personnel) and to outcome measures, such as life expectancy and the human development index. The latter is
itself both an outcome and an indicator of the extent to which people are able to benefit from existing facilities.
More precisely, five indicators are considered: per capita health expenditures (which include five items, namely
medical and public health, family welfare, nutrition, water supply and sanitation, and child welfare and disabled
welfare), per capita number of centres in rural areas (including Primary Health Centres, Sub-Centres and
Community Health Centres), per capita number of doctors, life expectancy at birth, and HDI, all measured in or
around the year 1991 (see Table 8A).
There is a rough consistency between the state rankings with respect to these indicators. Table 8B shows
the difference between the state value for each indicator and the average value. The best performing states are
Kerala and Himachal, which are always above the average, followed by Tamil Nadu and Punjab, each with just
one negative difference. The worst performing states are Andhra, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (always below the
average).
Given the high collinearity between these indicators of performance, factor analysis is applied to derive a
general performance measure. The first factor is highly significant, explaining 68 per cent of the total variance
(Table 9), and is thus retained for the calculation of the scoring coefficients. Above average performance states
(that is those with a score coefficient greater than zero) turn out to be, in descending order, Kerala, Himachal,
Punjab, Maharashtra, Haryana, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.
Table 10 (top half) shows the simple correlation coefficients between the performance indicator just
obtained and the measures of social capital so far identified, namely turnout at elections, and the two
components derived from the set of eleven variables from the CSDS survey. It is evident that only turnout at
elections exhibits a significant correlation with the performance indicator.
However, in section 3 we noted a remarkable positive correlation between turnout and literacy. In order to
allow for this intervening factor, we also measure the partial correlation coefficients. Table 10 (bottom half)
shows that the partial contribution of turnout to the explanation of performance variation across states, once the
influence of literacy alone or with the other social capital indicators is taken into account, is no more significant.
The reverse is true for literacy, e.g. the latter's correlation with performance, after allowing for social capital, is
still very significant.
This suggests that political participation does affect state performance, but merely because it implies higher
literacy levels. Education appears as a powerful element determining whether citizens are able to participate in
society at large, interact effectively with government, and promote democracy. The line of causation from social
capital to state performance is not proved in the context of Indian states, since, if literacy is a fundamental
intervening variable, it is itself a product of public policy.
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Kerala presents an interesting case in this respect. It is very much recognised that high social capital,
whereby trust in institutions, interest in public affairs and high degree of mobilisation go hand in hand, might be
regarded as a product as well as a cause of the observed good state performance in delivering public services
(Heller 1996; Krishnan 1998). It is an effect to the extent that initial high levels of literacy, which are in turn a
legacy of the enlightened policies of the princes of Travancore and Cochin during the last century, have enabled
this society, since independence, to give rise to democratic governments, which have ensured effective access of
public services to the population at large (including raising the living standards of the Malabar region, which,
not being formerly under the above mentioned principates, had very low literacy to start with). That Kerala is
not an isolated, curious product of history, and that deep-rooted factors are crucial, is indicated by the fact that
Sri Lanka would also appear as having a high social capital if it were included in the analysis, and this is a
society which shares with Kerala many cultural, ethnic and historical features.24
Citizens' level of education is a good predictor of the extent to which various kinds of public services are
effectively put to use in India (Minhas 1991). The analysis in this paper suggests that the role of literacy is even
more pervasive, as it impinges directly on social capital and democratic performance. In a country where the
majority of the population is still illiterate, access to the main instruments of democratic participation (voting,
newspapers, but also self-confidence and assertive attitudes in the face of public officials) may be severely
limited. This issue has been understandably underplayed in Putnam's analysis of Italian regions, but it may be
the most crucial element to take into account in India, if democracy and people's well-being are to be promoted.
Widespread illiteracy represents the main paradox in the largest democracy of the world (Weiner 1991).
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has aimed to contribute to current debates on social capital by examining the applicability to the
Indian context of a definition, used in Putnam (1993), based on the Tocquevillian notion of the civic
community. Whereas much of the current debate on social capital is seemingly trapped in a never-ending
controversy on which kind of social relationships are good, in what sense they are good, and for whom,
Putnam's notion at least has the merit of focusing on a specific set of social relationships, and on a particular
framework, which assesses effects on institutional performance. There is plenty of qualitative evidence from
India to suggest that features such as the level of trust and norms of cooperation crucially impinge on social
well-being and on the effectiveness of government actions. However, so far there has been no study attempting
to assess the role of measurable aspects of social capital in accounting for observed differences in performance
across Indian states. This paper discusses the limits involved in such exercises and, in so doing, provides
suggestions as to the direction further analysis in this area should take. Three types of conclusions and
implications emerge from our analysis.
First, Indian state data for the indicators that are normally used to proxy civic behaviour are hard to
identify, or the data that already exist cannot be interpreted unambiguously as a measure of civicness. Not only
aggregate data but also survey data might be unable to capture relevant aspects, even when they are high quality
enquiries carried out by a prestigious institute, as in the case of the CSDS survey analysed in Section 3. We have
noted for instance problems related to the very important questions of participation in associations and trust in
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government institutions. The percentages of respondents who are members of associations seem too low in the
light of the perception of a more vibrant associational life derived from direct field observations. With regard to
trust variables, there is the difficulty of interpreting whether low trust is due to malfeasance of representatives or
lack of interest from the people, and whether it is restricted to existing governments or extends to all previous
ones.
These dilemmas suggest the need for survey questions to be very carefully designed, and for future
research in this area to accompany the use of aggregate and survey data with other methods of data collection,
such as direct field observation, in order to capture more effectively the desired characteristics. Possibly, for the
case of India, one would require an even richer combination and analysis of data sources than the one relied
upon by Putnam for Italy, because of the lower data quality and the greater complexity of features.
Second, features which supposedly reflect collective structures of co-operation in Indian society and
culture, are elusive to measurement and meaningless to frame within states as units of analysis. Indian states are
complex and internally differentiated entities; moreover, there is no consistency between their performance
indicators. Whereas the neatness of Putnam's theory as applied to regional development in Italy is due to the
fact that social capital explains not only differential democratic performance but also delivery of public goods
and long-run growth, in India such a clear-cut theory is ruled out by the fact that states rank very differently
according to the particular aspect under consideration. One cannot expect a single indicator, however
composite, to be able to account for either the diversity of Indian regional development, or state institutional
performance as such. This does not amount to the conclusion that social capital cannot be measured or is not
relevant for socio-economic development in India, but rather that it may be better located at a different level
than the state.
One possible direction for future research would be to carry out the analysis at two levels, respectively
larger and smaller than the state. Clusters of states within India can be fruitfully compared, for instance the
North versus the South,25 or Hindi versus non-Hindi states, or 'Bimaru' states versus the rest.26  At the same
time, a number of small areas within each cluster may be identified for carrying out fieldwork and derive first-
hand information on the different aspects of social capital.27  Differences in terms of institutional performance
might then be more clearly grounded in prevailing cultural patterns and types of social relationships, whose
origin in India rests in deep-rooted factors that are only weakly reflected by recently drawn state borders.
The third and most important implication of our research is that the relationship between social capital and
institutional performance is characterised by complex dynamics. Whereas people's involvement in public affairs
and their civic character might be important to explain current government performance, these elements are also
affected by education, which is itself a product of previous policies. Future research must therefore address this
issue and disentangle the elements of this relationship. This might imply re-qualifying the frequently made
policy recommendation to invest in social capital. A more relevant point could be that public policy, insofar as it
promotes universal education, might have a great impact on social capital.
Putnam himself recognised the complex interaction between social capital and institutional practices, and
suggested that the experience of Italian regional governments, in the South as well as in the North, does indicate
that 'changing formal institutions can change political practice' (Putnam 1993: p.184). However, he did not
explore the implications of this fact in his work on Italy. The analysis of the process by which institutional
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change can take societies out of their vicious circle of distrust, defection and exploitation is a challenge mostly
lying ahead. Education policies may provide an essential element of this process in the Indian case.
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NOTES
1 The World Bank is particularly involved in this process: a major project led by Deepa Narayan aims to
collect, on the basis of an extensive questionnaire, data on social capital from several countries. A
discussion list has been set up on the web on social capital, with the objective, among others, of promoting
exchange of views and information on practical problems of measurement and their implication for policy
intervention.
2 For references see Toye (1998) and Woolcock (1998).
3 The success of 'social capital' within modern economics explains, and is explained by, the use of the term
'capital': this term emphasises both the measurability aspect and the instrumental role in producing
desirable outcomes. Although largely used as if it were a neutral and unambiguous concept, the notion of
capital within economic thought has a long history of controversies, which started with the debate on
physical and financial capital, and has continued more recently when the terms 'human capital' and 'natural
capital' were introduced. The term 'social', on the other hand, refers to something that inheres in neither
individuals nor material things, but in inter-personal relationships.
4 The sociologist Bourdieu has particularly emphasised the implications of differential power and positions
of individuals within social networks. See Bourdieu (1990) and (1992).
5 Gambetta (1988) explains in detail how this condition lies at the heart of the Mafia phenomenon in
Southern Italy.
6 For references on this point see Woolcock (1998).
7 With the 72nd amendment to the Indian constitution, passed in 1991, the establishment of lower levels of
government (the three-tier Panchayati Raj structure) was at last included in the enforceable part of the
constitution. The fact that up until then it had only figured under the Provisions was held as the reason for
the low political profile of these bodies, which were dormant in most states with elections constantly
deferred.
8 The dates for national and state assemblies coincide during 1952-67 and then start to diverge most of the
time. For years when both a state and a national election were held, the average turnout is obtained. Data
for Vidhan Sabha are obtained only up to 1989 rather than 1991.
9 For a discussion of the contrasting kinship patterns between the south and the north see Sopher (1980),
also Dyson and Moore (1983), who analyse the consequences in terms of female status and demographic
indicators.
10 This deficiency will hopefully be filled thanks to an ongoing study on the voluntary sector in India, co-
ordinated by Participatory Research in Asia, an NGO based in Delhi.
11 The CSDS has conducted various other surveys, but only the 1996 National Election Study and a similar
one in 1972 cover all of India (a third, conducted after the 1998 elections, has yet to generate final results).
As the 1972 survey was based on a smaller sample and on a much shorter questionnaire, it was not taken
into account. The 1996 National Election Study covers constituencies in 21 of the major states and union
territories of India, on the basis of a representative sample of the Indian electorate, stratified by gender,
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age, education, occupation, caste, religion, economic class and rural-urban location. The sample consisted
of slightly less than 10,000 people.
12 None of these figures, nor any study based on these data, has ever been published. I would like to thank
Prof. V.B. Singh, Director of CSDS, for making available the state-level data relative to these 13 questions.
13 The Union Territory of Pondicherry has scores not that different from those of Kerala. They are not,
however, included in Table 3.
14 Against some possible arguments that a higher prevalence of contact with officials could indicate greater
scope for corruption, the interpretation is endorsed here that it is a manifestation of a personal and direct
involvement with public service providers, and an opportunity to exercise rights of protest and criticism.
15 See Drèze and Gazdar (1997), Krishnan (1998); also Probe Team (1999).
16 See Putnam (1993, Ch. 3). Putnam states that 'the success or failure of Italy's regional governments was
wholly uncorrelated with virtually all measures of political fragmentation, ideological polarisation and
social conflict' (p.117). Measures of the distance between parties (in terms of strength and ideology), of the
distribution of voters' opinion on crucial issues, of fragmentation of parties at regional level, on economic
conflicts and social tensions, on geographic disparities and on the level of conflict in society as seen by
leaders, were all tried but none offered the least support that social and political strife is incompatible with
good government.
17 Moreover, religious and ethnic differences may suddenly become a hindrance where they were not before,
following changes in external circumstances. Examples of conflicts suddenly arising between groups who
had peacefully co-existed in the past include, Yugoslavia, Palestine to some extent before the formation of
the state of Israel, and Kashmir, where Muslim and Hindu had long co-existed relatively peacefully up to
the rule of Sheikh Abdullah (Bose 1995).
18 Note that caste fragmentation cannot be considered because of the lack of census data on caste
composition since 1931 (the 1941 Census suffered from serious disruption due to India's involvement in
World War II). After independence, the abolition of questions relative to caste was decided for political
reasons (commitment to a united India where social divisions of all kinds would be underplayed).
19 In the following we are mainly concerned with inter-state comparisons, thus overlooking the crucial
variations occurring within each state, some of which are more populous than most world nations.
However, since state governments in India hold powers of decision in policy areas which are more relevant
for the people at large, notably agriculture and social sectors, an understanding of patterns of development
by state is a prerequisite to examine development issues in India.
20 'Bimaru' is an acronym derived from the initials of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh,
but it also means 'ailing/sick' in Hindi.
21 See also Nagaraj et al. (1998) for an account of Rajasthan's recent growth performance.
22 The record in terms of poverty reduction is also impressive. In 1972-73 Kerala was only 10th among
Indian states in terms of the headcount poverty index (which was then greater than 60 per cent) but
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managed to reach fourth position in 1987-88, by almost halving the proportion of people below the
poverty line.
23 Increases in per capita consumer expenditures (which are reflected in a decrease of headcount poverty)
were achieved not by means of national income growth (SDP has grown very slowly during the past
decades) but thanks to the remittances from migrants abroad, especially from those working in the Gulf
countries.
24 I am indebted to Mick Moore for making this connection.
25 See also footnote 9.
26 I am indebted to Stephen Devereux for this suggestion.
27 A team of researchers from the Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, J.N.U., Delhi, is
collecting data on horizontal relationships and other aspects of civic behaviour from four localities in
India. However, the purpose of their research, which is part of a larger programme on social capital and
democracy in segmented societies, is not comparison within India as much with South Africa.
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APPENDIX: FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1  Turnout at  Lok and Vidhan Sabha elections,  1952-91
year
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Table 1   Average Turnout at  Elections and Literacy
STATE TURNOUT DIFFT LITERACY DIFFL
Andhra Pradesh 63.52 3.82 32.62 -9.14
Assam 59.58 -0.12 38.47 -3.29
Bihar 53.45 -6.25 28.08 -13.68
Gujarat 55.54 -4.16 46.37 4.6
Haryana 67.28 7.58 49.59 7.83
Himachal Pradesh 61.17 1.47 57.35 15.59
Karnataka 62.15 2.45 41.1 -0.66
Kerala 74.6 14.9 72.18 30.41
Madhya Pradesh 50.06 -9.64 30.29 -11.47
Maharashtra 58.86 -0.84 48.61 6.85
Orissa 45.67 -14.03 35.44 -6.32
Punjab 65.19 5.49 41.04 -0.72
Rajasthan 52.05 -7.65 26.67 -15.09
Tamil Nadu 67.7 8 47.23 5.47
Uttar Pradesh 51.25 -8.45 29.52 -12.24
West Bengal 67.09 7.39 43.63 1.87
TURNOUT: Mean turnout at Lok and Vidhan Sabha elections, 1952-91 (%)
DIFFT: Difference between mean state turnout and 16-states average turnout
LITERACY: Mean literacy rate, 1961-91 (1981-91 for Haryana and Himachal) (%)
DIFFL: Difference between mean state literacy and 16-states average literacy
Sources: Singh and Bose (1984); Singh (1994); Butler et al. (1991).
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Table 2   Variables from CSDS Questionnaire
Question asked Answer
considered
Groupings of
variables
Short name for
variable
Opinions/Views
Do you think it is important or not important for
you to vote the same way your caste
group/community votes?
Not important Election
Variables
Vote
Would you say that persons we elect by voting
generally care about what people like you think, or
that they don't care?
Care Elected
How much does having elections from time to
time make the government pay attention to the
people- good deal, somewhat or not much?
Good deal Election role
How much trust/confidence do you have in the
state government- a great deal, somewhat or no
trust at all?
Great Deal
Trust
Variables
Trust in SG
How much trust do you have in local
government/panchayat/municipality- a great deal,
somewhat or no trust at all?
Great Deal Trust in LG
How much trust do you have in government
officials- a great deal, somewhat or no trust at all?
Great Deal Trust Official
'Action'/Personal Involvement
Leaving aside the period of elections, how much
interest would you say you have in politics and
public affairs, a great deal of interest, some interest,
or no interest at all?
Great Deal Interest
Let us talk about associations and organisations
other than political parties: are you a member of
any religious or caste organisation?
Yes Membership in
Association
Rel/caste
Aside from caste and religious organisation, do you
belong to any other associations and organisations
like the co-operatives, farmers' association, trade
unions, welfare organisations, cultural and sports
organisations, etc.?
Yes Other ass
Have you ever contacted any government official
for any need or problem?
Yes Contact
Do you read newspaper? (If yes) How often-
regularly, sometimes or rarely?
Regularly Media
Variables
Paper
Do you listen to Radio? (If yes) How often-
regularly, sometimes or rarely?
Regularly Radio
Of those, on which source did you depend most
for getting information about elections, parties and
candidates? None, newspaper, radio, TV, any
combination of two, all three.
Any answer
apart from NO
is considered
and the sum is
derived
Information
Source:  National Election Study 1996, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi
Table 3  State-Level Values for Different Variables from 1996 CSDS Survey
State Vote Elected Elections Trust SG Trust LG Trust Off Interest Rel/caste Other ass Contact Papers Radio Media
ANDHRA P. 53.3 32.3 11.5 31.2 31.8 18.8 4.8 17.5 12.1 13.9 49.5
ASSAM 43 35.5 44.3 64.5 64.9 35.1 7 4.4 14 20.6 9.6 14.5 49.1
BIHAR 27.2 14.2 11.9 30 29.8 16 9.5 3.1 3.5 15.5 5.8 10 40
GUJARAT 72.5 9.1 7 22.2 39.8 11.6 3.3 1 3.5 11 16.6 3.9 43.7
HARYANA 45.2 25 16.1 32.7 28 7.7 7.1 0 3 14.9 7.1 7.1 24.4
HIMACHAL
P.
24.2 19.4 4.8 56.5 77.4 24.2 4.8 4.8 9.7 8.1 6.5 19.4 30.6
KARNATAK
A
47.9 13.7 3.6 29.3 34.6 17.3 9.6 3 7.3 13.7 11.3 17.3 40.4
KERALA 74.9 45.2 40.8 54.2 58.6 18.7 19.5 12 23.6 35 29.7 35.9 83.4
MADHYA P. 36.8 22.9 7.1 37.8 35.2 27.3 6.6 2.5 3.5 15.6 3.7 5.9 33.5
MAHARASH. 52.5 22.2 8.8 34.1 40.8 14.5 6.3 3.7 9.1 19.7 14.4 15.1 37.7
ORISSA 48.3 20.1 2.4 49 51.5 34.3 5.6 2.1 7 16.1 5.6 7.5 29.8
PUNJAB 29.2 10.3 8.2 15.9 13.8 5.6 4.1 2.1 1 10.8 11.3 8.2 24.1
RAJASTHAN 39.3 26.9 11.7 50.3 36.4 11.1 2.8 1.9 2.2 14.3 11.3 12.1 32.8
TAMIL
NADU
73.1 21.8 6.1 36.5 40.3 14.1 7.5 7.4 9.1 11.7 16.1 17.8 66.1
UTTAR P. 44.8 22.6 14 37.7 42.1 18.6 7.1 2.9 9.6 27.5 9.3 12.5 51.1
WEST B. 52 29.6 13.8 41 50.6 15.6 11.7 3.6 16.5 32 11.6 15.3 42.1
Mean 47.76 23.18 13.26 38.93 42.23 18.16 7.33 3.63 8.17 17.75 11.38 13.53 42.39
Source:  National Election Study 1996, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi
Table 4  Matrix of Correlation of  CSDS Data
Vote elected election trust SG trust LG trust Off rel/caste other ass interest contact papers radio media
Vote 1.00
1.00
elected 0.32 1.00
0.22 0.77*
election 0.22 0.00 0.55* 1.00
0.41 0.67* 0.03
trust SG -0.03 0.00 0.38 0.85* 1.00
0.90 0.45* 0.15 0.00
trust LG 0.09 0.08 0.26 0.68* 0.65* 1.00
0.74 0.32 0.33 0.00 0.01
trust Off -0.12 0.23 0.52* 0.44* 0.48* 0.18 1.00
0.67 0.64* 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.53
rel/caste 0.47* 0.01 0.65* 0.57* 0.67 0.34 0.81* 1.00
0.08 0.78* 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.00
other ass 0.47* 0.00 0.55* 0.26 0.26 0.07 0.75* 0.80* 1.00
0.08 0.57* 0.03 0.34 0.33 0.79 0.00 0.00
interest 0.38 0.02 0.61* 0.33 0.26 0.14 0.50* 0.80* 0.75 1.00
0.14 0.71* 0.01 0.22 0.32 0.62 0.06 0.00 0.00
contact 0.36 0.00 0.46* 0.05 0.13 -0.28 0.73* 0.62 0.59* 0.47* 1.00
0.18 0.45* 0.07 0.85 0.62 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06
papers 0.77* 0.08 0.52* 0.48* 0.51* 0.09 0.92* 0.84* 0.76* 0.54* 0.72* 1.00
0.00 0.65* 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
radio 0.36 0.01 0.55* 0.27 0.31 0.10 0.87* 0.75* 0.68* 0.58* 0.79* 0.75* 1.00
0.17 0.59* 0.03 0.31 0.24 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Media 0.72* 0.02
0.00
30
Table 5  Factor Analysis:  Social  Capital  Variables
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
1 5.47137 3.16139 0.5746 0.5746
2 2.30998 1.52807 0.2426 0.8172
3 0.78191 0.27107 0.0821 0.8993
4 0.51084 0.14506 0.0536 0.9529
5 0.36578 0.21239 0.0384 0.9913
6 0.15339 0.04254 0.0161 1.0074
7 0.11085 0.11713 0.0116 1.0191
8 -0.00628 0.03897 -0.0007 1.0184
9 -0.04525 0.00438 -0.0048 1.0137
10 -0.04963 0.03098 -0.0052 1.0085
11 -0.08061 . -0.0085 1
Scoring Coefficients
Variable FACTOR1 FACTOR2
vote 0.13167 -0.14906
elected 0.15081 0.01907
election 0.13678 0.08446
trustsg 0.12751 0.45413
trustlg 0.06523 0.26091
trustoff 0.05158 0.08342
interest 0.12604 -0.06586
contact 0.1149 -0.01467
papers 0.11658 -0.47635
radio 0.22308 -0.02856
media 0.10616 -0.01813
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Table 6  State Rankings with Respect  to the First  Two Factors (Social  Capital)
STATE FACTOR1 STATE FACTOR2
KERALA 3.05 ASSAM 1.85
ASSAM 1.03 HIMACHAL PRADESH 1.85
WEST BENGAL 0.59 ORISSA 1.1
TAMIL NADU 0.35 MADHYA PRADESH 0.64
UTTAR PRADESH 0.09 RAJASTHAN 0.41
ANDHRA PRADESH 0.05 UTTAR PRADESH 0.13
MAHARASHTRA -0.03 BIHAR 0.04
HIMACHAL PRADESH -0.22 WEST BENGAL 0.04
KARNATAKA -0.28 HARYANA -0.13
RAJASTHAN -0.29 ANDHRA PRADESH -0.51
ORISSA -0.39 MAHARASHTRA -0.53
HARYANA -0.59 KARNATAKA -0.6
MADHYA PRADESH -0.64 TAMIL NADU -0.85
BIHAR -0.68 KERALA -0.99
GUJARAT -0.71 PUNJAB -1.17
PUNJAB -1.33 GUJARAT -1.29
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Table 7  Selected Socio-Economic Indicators,  by State
STATE GROWTH         HDC        SDP          IMR        LEB     FEMLIT           HDI
Andhra Pradesh 2.1 36.9 5570 70.4 60.6 32.72 0.4 0.4
Assam 2.1 42.4 4230 88.7 54.9 43.03 0.379 0.379
Bihar 1.1 58.29 2904 89.2 58.5 22.89 0.354 0.354
Gujarat 3.6 43.13 6425 68.7 60.1 48.64 0.467 0.467
Haryana 3.1 20.72 8690 73.3 62.9 40.47 0.489 0.489
Himachal Pradesh 2.4 15.46 5355 55.8 63.6 52.13 0.454 0.454
Karnataka 2.4 42.73 5555 65.4 61.9 44.34 0.448 0.448
Kerala 3.6 33.8 4618 23.8 72 86.17 0.603 0.603
Madhya Pradesh 1.7 47.93 4077 85.2 54 28.85 0.349 0.349
Maharashtra 3.8 43.05 8180 50.5 64.2 52.32 0.523 0.523
Orissa 1.3 27.14 4068 112.1 55.5 34.68 0.373 0.373
Punjab 3.2 16.78 9643 53.7 66.4 50.41 0.529 0.529
Rajasthan 3.6 38.96 4361 72.6 58 20.44 0.356 0.356
Tamil Nadu 4.1 42.02 5078 67.7 62.4 51.33 0.438 0.438
Uttar Pradesh 1.9 36.88 4012 99.9 55.9 25.31 0.348 0.348
West Bengal 2.3 39.11 5383 75.3 61.5 46.56 0.459 0.459
GROWTH: Annual rate of growth of state domestic product, 1980-93 (%)
HDC: Headcount index of poverty, 1992-93 (%)
SDP: Per-capita net state domestic product at current prices, 1991-92 (Rs/year)
IMR: Infant mortality rates, 1992-93 (per 1,000 live births)
LEB: Life expectancy at birth, 1989-91 (number of years)
FEMLIT: Female literacy, 1991 (%)
HDI: Human development index, 1991
Sources: Shenggen et al (1998); Drèze and Sen (1995), Table A.3; Shiva Kumar (1996),
Census of India 1991; Government of India, Ministry of Health (1992).
Table 7B  State Ranking
STATE GROWTH HDC SDP IMR LEB FEMLIT HDI
Andhra Pradesh 12 7 5 8 9 12 10
Assam 11 11 12 13 15 9 11
Bihar 16 16 16 14 11 15 14
Gujarat 5 14 4 7 10 6 5
Haryana 7 3 2 10 5 10 4
Himachal Pradesh 8 1 8 4 4 3 7
Karnataka 9 12 6 5 7 8 8
Kerala 3 5 10 1 1 1 1
Madhya Pradesh 14 15 13 12 16 13 15
Maharashtra 2 13 3 2 3 2 3
Orissa 15 4 14 16 14 11 12
Punjab 6 2 1 3 2 5 2
Rajasthan 4 8 11 9 12 16 13
Tamil Nadu 1 10 9 6 6 4 9
Uttar Pradesh 13 6 15 15 13 14 16
West Bengal 10 9 7 11 8 7 6
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Table 8A  Selected Indicators of  State Performance
STATE HEALTH
EXPEND
HEALTH
CENTRES
DOCTORS LEB HDI
Andhra Pradesh 32.77 13.87 2.34 60.6 0.4
Assam 35.28 25.01 2.61 54.9 0.379
Bihar 21.35 19.56 2.46 58.5 0.354
Gujarat 47.27 17.61 1.49 60.1 0.467
Haryana 42.36 16.44 2.81 62.9 0.489
Himachal Pradesh 118.92 33.61 4.82 63.6 0.454
Karnataka 42.65 20.17 1.81 61.9 0.448
Kerala 58.11 20.74 4.09 72 0.603
Madhya Pradesh 37.16 20.04 2.04 54 0.349
Maharashtra 39.31 14.16 3.62 64.2 0.523
Orissa 35.02 20.32 1.32 55.5 0.373
Punjab 43.97 23.11 7.96 66.4 0.529
Rajasthan 54.56 20.98 2.17 58 0.356
Tamil Nadu 44.95 18.15 4.52 62.4 0.438
Uttar Pradesh 22.87 17.95 1.63 55.9 0.348
West Bengal 40.86 13.96 1.77 61.5 0.459
HEALTH EXPEND: Per-capita state government health expenditures, 1991-92 (current price Rs)
HEALTH CENTRES: Number of PHC centres, Sub-centres and Community Health centres, 1990 (per
10,000 population)
DOCTORS: Doctors at Primary Health Care centres, 1991 (per 10,000 population)
LEB: Life expectancy at birth, 1989-91 (number of years)
HDI: Human development index, 1991
Sources: Reddy and Selvaraju (1994); Government of India, Ministry of Health (1992); IIPS (1995); Shiva
Kumar (1996).
Table 8B  Differences between State Indicators of  Performance and
Average Values
STATE Health Exp Health C. Doctors LEB HDI
Andhra Pradesh -12.07 -5.86 -0.63 -0.18 -0.04
Assam -9.56 5.28 -0.36 -5.88 -0.06
Bihar -23.49 -0.17 -0.51 -2.28 -0.08
Gujarat 2.43 -2.12 -1.48 -0.68 0.03
Haryana -2.48 -3.29 -0.16 2.12 0.05
Himachal Pradesh 74.08 13.88 1.85 2.82 0.02
Karnataka -2.19 0.44 -1.16 1.12 0.01
Kerala 13.27 1.01 1.12 11.22 0.17
Madhya Pradesh -7.68 0.31 -0.93 -6.78 -0.09
Maharashtra -5.53 -5.57 0.65 3.42 0.09
Orissa -9.82 0.59 -1.65 -5.28 -0.06
Punjab -0.87 3.38 4.99 5.62 0.09
Rajasthan 9.72 1.25 -0.8 -2.78 -0.08
Tamil Nadu 0.11 -1.58 1.55 1.62 0
Uttar Pradesh -21.97 -1.78 -1.34 -4.88 -0.09
West Bengal -3.98 -5.77 -1.2 0.72 0.02
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Table 9  Factor Analysis :  Peformance Variables
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
1 2.58 1.32 0.68 0.68
2 1.26 1.10 0.33 1.01
3 0.17 0.22 0.04 1.05
4 -0.05 0.10 -0.01 1.04
5 -0.15 . -0.04 1.00
Factor Loadings
Variable 1 2 3 Uniqueness
HDI 0.84 -0.44 -0.08 0.10
LEB 0.89 -0.38 -0.05 0.06
Doctors 0.72 0.05 0.32 0.37
Tcentre 0.40 0.79 0.07 0.21
Meanexp 0.64 0.54 -0.23 0.24
Scoring Coefficients Score Coefficients
Variable 1 State Perform.
HDI 0.24 Kerala 2.09
LEB 0.59 Himachal 1.63
Doctors 0.06 Punjab 1.41
Tcentre 0.32 Maharashtra 0.35
Meanexp 0.07 Haryana 0.21
Tamil 0.17
Karnataka 0.16
Gujarat -0.17
WB -0.27
Rajasthan -0.52
Andhra -0.58
Assam -0.61
Bihar -0.65
Orissa -0.91
UP -1.13
Madhya -1.16
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Table 10  Simple and Partial  Correlation Coefficient Matrices
between Performance and Social  Capital  Variables
Matrix of Simple (Pearson) Correlation Coefficients
Perform. Turnout Factor1 Factor2 Literacy
Perform. 1
Turnout 0.7185 1
(0.0017)
Factor1 0.3402 0.5156 1
(0.1973) (0.0409)
Factor2 -0.2745 -0.4328 -0.0042 1
(0.3036) (0.0941) (0.9877)
Literacy 0.8477 0.7283 0.5829 -0.223 1
(0) (0.0014) (0.0178) (0.4064)
Significance level in brackets
Partial Correlation Coefficients of the Performance Variable with:
Variable Corr. Sig.
Turnout 0.2782 0.315
Literacy 0.6806 0.005
Factor1 -0.3398 0.235
Factor2 -0.1176 0.689
Literacy 0.8372 0
Turnout 0.3517 0.239
Literacy 0.7468 0.003
Factor1 -0.4241 0.149
Factor2 0.0527 0.864
(Obs=16)
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